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Abstrak
Artikel ini berusaha mengkaji perubahan dalam politik di Malaysia dengan memfokuskan pada 
aspek politik ekonomi dan ideologi modern. Ini didasarkan pada perkembangan Pemilu di Malaysia 
pada tahun 2004, di mana PAS menang tipis di Kelantan. Dalam konteks ini, PAS telah keliru 
memahami adanya sentimen di kalangan masyarakat mengenai keadalan dan pemerintahan yang 
baik, khususnya berkenaan dengan agenda Negara Islam. Hal ini juga berkenaan usaha kerja 
sama PAS dengan DAP dalam Barisan Alternatif. Namun hasil dari pemilu pada tahun 2004 
tidak menunjukkan hasil seperti yang diinginkan oleh anggota PAS. Makalah ini berpendapat 
bahwa apapun perubahan dalam struktur PAS akan memerlukan waktu yang cukup lama. 
Kata Kunci: PAS, Ulama, Negara Islam, Barisan Alternatif.
Abstract
The shattering defeat of PAS in the 2004 general elections, while holding on to the reins of 
government in the state of Kelantan by a tiny majority, heralded an era of introspection for party 
leaders and strategists. PAS had misread popular sentiment for justice and good governance, which 
had propelled it into recording massive gains at the expense of its arch-rival UMNO in 1999, as an 
endorsement of its Islamic state agenda. Its adamant retention of this agenda, costing it an alliance 
with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Barisan Alternatif (BA) coalition, was most vividly 
displayed by its revelation of the Islamic State Document (ISD) in late 2003. While PAS does not 
claim to have disavowed the ISD, deliberations on the ISD seem to have stalled in preference for 
internal party reforms. Prodding for the reforms are the young professionals whose influx into the 
party in the mid-1990s transformed the landscape of PAS which in the 1960s was closely identified 
with the Malay peasantry class. Clearly, the impact of globalization and the rise of the middle class 
during the era of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Premiership have not eluded PAS. This paper traces 
such changes, focusing on the realms of political economy and ideological modernization. Internal 
pressures for changes have accelerated since the electoral setback of 2004 and a string of by-election 
defeats, at the risk of alienating grassroots party activists who hold the conservative ulama leadership 
in high esteem. This paper contends that any structural transformation in PAS will necessarily take 
a long time. Internal fissures are not automatically solved by electoral success, as experienced by PAS 
in the March 2008 elections, when PAS not only retained the state of Kelantan, but also shared the 
spoils of power in Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Penang as a component party of the newly assembled 
People’s Pact (PR: Pakatan Rakyat) coalition.  
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A. Background: The Islamic state in the recent ideological discourse of PAS
The shattering defeat of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia) in the 
country’s 2004 general elections was one of its worst-ever electoral setbacks in terms of parliamentary 
representation. PAS witnessed its representation drop from 27 to 6 seats in the federal parliament 
and from 98 to 36 seats in state legislative assemblies. Its leader lost his status as Leader of the 
Opposition in parliament, while at the state level, PAS lost the state of Terengganu which it 
unexpectedly captured in 1999, and held on to the reins of government in its stronghold, Kelantan, 
by a tiny 3-seat (24 to 21) majority in the state legislature.1
Such a depressing portrayal of PAS’s performance, as adopted by both local and foreign 
media (Rusli, 2004; Bakar, 2004)2, overlooks the fact that the popular votes for PAS had actually 
registered a slight increase from 1999. Support for PAS among its hardcore following and like-
minded pro-Islamist Malay constituents was more or less consistent. In the Malay heartland states 
of northern and north-eastern Malaysia, despite a slight erosion of electoral support, PAS retained 
significant influence and was very much on level terms with its arch-rival, the United Malays’ 
National Organisation (UMNO),3 in large Malay-majority constituencies. Academic analyses have 
attributed PAS’s defeat in 2004 to its failure  to attract support from the burgeoning middle class 
– both Malay and non-Malay, women and youth, who made up most of the newly enfranchised 
800,000 or so voters (Baharuddin, 2004; Gomez, 2006: 91-94; Funston, 2006: 152-154). In the 
1999 elections, the rising urban middle class deserted the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) in droves, 
as a protest against what they saw was a steady deterioration of standards of justice, democracy 
and good governance under Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as exemplified succinctly in 
the social debacle and pro-Reformasi (reform) unrests following his unceremonious dismissal of 
Deputy Prime Minister-cum-Deputy President of UMNO Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998. By 
2004, enthusiasm for Reformasi had waned, the economy had largely recovered from the 1997-98 
recession, the opposition coalition was in disarray and the ruling coalition could boast a new leader 
in Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who had embarked on a subtle process of de-Mahathirisation once 
installed into power in late October 2003 (Boo-Teik, 2003: 2-6 dan 2004: 8). Long regarded as the 
nemesis of Malaysian civil society, Dr. Mahathir’s retirement from formal politics divested BN of 
a detested object of opprobrium in the eyes of a new middle class which had been prodding for 
greater democratic space since the early 1990s. This middle class was now prepared to give Abdullah 
Badawi, who had declared the fight against corruption and Islam Hadhari4 to be cornerstones of his 
administration, the chance to prove his democratic credentials (Funston, 2006: 146-147; Abdul-
Hamid, 2006: 114-117).
Driven by common concerns to defend justice, democracy and good governance, PAS had 
contested the 1999 elections under the banner of the Alternative Front (BA: Barisan Alternatif), 
which grouped PAS together with the multi-racial Anwar Ibrahim-inspired National Justice Party 
(KEADILAN: Parti Keadilan Nasional), the Chinese-dominated social-democratic Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and the Malay socialist-oriented People’s Party of Malaysia (PRM: Parti Rakyat 
Malaysia). Various civil society elements and human rights organisations openly or tacitly backed 
BA in the name of social and political reform. As the biggest election contender among Reformasi 
elements, PAS was identified as the natural leader of BA almost by default (Salleh, 2000a: 44). In 
the name of coalition unity, PAS was willing to drop its cherished ideal of an Islamic state from 
BA’s manifesto - ‘Towards a Just and Democratic Malaysia’, and campaigned instead for a broad-
based, transparent, accountable and tolerant governance (Funston, 2000: 38; Weiss, 2000: 426). 
Having reached such an electoral understanding which bore fruit in delivering huge setbacks to 
BN in terms of popular votes, decline of parliamentary representation and defeats of ministers 
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and deputy ministers, PAS’s coalition partners in BA were comprehensibly taken aback by PAS’s 
post-election reversion to its pro-Islamic state stance. DAP lamented PAS’s leaders’ recurring open 
declarations of its commitment to create a juridical Islamic state if granted power at the federal level. 
It warned that such an entity not only flouted BA’s common manifesto but was also incompatible 
with parliamentary democracy, power sharing in a plural society, human rights, women’s rights, 
personal freedoms and constitutional tolerance. After issuing several public statements specifying 
reservations on the compatibility between BA ideals and the Islamic state, DAP eventually withdrew 
from BA in September 2001 and closed all doors of negotiation with a PAS which adamantly retained 
an Islamic state agenda in any form (Siang, 2001: 85-103).5
At the level of state governance, PAS’s insistence on an Islamic state agenda was demonstrated by 
its attempts in Terengganu to impose the kharaj (land tax) on non-Muslims and to force through the 
Syari’ah Criminal Offences (Hudud and Qisas) Enactment, which nevertheless remained inoperative 
due to its being in contravention to the Federal Constitution.6 PAS’s policy turnabout was quickened 
by the untimely death in June 2002 of its president, Fadzil Noor, whose brand of accommodative 
politics was instrumental in PAS’s leadership of the People’s Unity Front (APU: Angkatan Perpaduan 
Ummah)7 and BA coalitions. The compromises reached with other opposition parties had brought 
PAS out of the political fringes by transforming PAS’s sagging electoral fortunes (Jaffar, 2001: 
i-xviii). But towards the end of his tenure as president, Fadzil had to weather fierce criticisms by 
radical elements within PAS who became worried that Fadzil would eventually strike a political 
compromise with UMNO and BN. Considering Fadzil’s willingness in May 2002 to appear on stage 
together with Dr. Mahathir in a public function to commemorate the Palestinian struggle, such a 
fear was not unwarranted.8 The takeover of PAS’s leadership by Terengganu Chief Minister Abdul 
Hadi Awang, notorious in Malaysia for having issued an edict in 1981 which allegedly equated 
UMNO’s religious beliefs with those of non-Muslims,9 sealed the future direction of PAS as a party 
placing the implementation of an Islamic state at the forefront of its political agenda. Prior to Abdul 
Hadi Awang’s assertion of full control at the helm of party affairs, the mainstream media and BA 
coalition partners had seized on equivocal statements by other party leaders such as Murshid al-‘Am-
cum- Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and once vice presidents Mustafa Ali and Dr. 
Hassan Ali, to argue that PAS’s objective was an Islamic society, as affirmed in the party constitution, 
rather than an Islamic state (Siang, 2001: 55).10
Vestiges of equivocation on the Islamic state were eventually wiped out with the proclamation 
of the Islamic State Document (ISD) in November 2003. The ISD was a direct response to calls from 
party critics and academic analysts for PAS to produce some kind of operational blueprint spelling 
out features of the Islamic state it aspired to (Salleh, 1999a: 242).11 In launching the ISD, PAS 
President Abdul Hadi Awang reaffirmed PAS’s commitments to the accomplishment of justice and 
equality cutting across race, religion, culture, language and political persuasion; to parliamentary 
democracy, to the ending of draconian legislation such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), and to 
women’s involvement in mainstream national and social development (Hadi-Awang, 2003). But 
information on the ISD from PAS’s point of view failed to reach an audience beyond its traditional 
supporters. Explanations by PAS leaders were available only through PAS’s official mouthpiece 
Harakah, which since March 2000 had been circumscribed to become a bi-monthly rather than a 
weekly publication and restricted to PAS members only. 
Hence, while no mention of a theocratic state was made in the ISD, the prevailing impression 
conveyed in the mainstream media was otherwise.12 According to a booklet issued by the government 
in response to the ISD, even if there were any genuinely Islamic stipulations in the ISD, they had 
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already been implemented by the BN-led Malaysian state, which professes to be an Islamic state in 
its own mould (bin Haji-Ahmad, 2004).13 Disadvantaged by its lack of media outlets, the net result 
of the war of words between UMNO and PAS was a widening gulf between the ideals of PAS and the 
aspirations of both Malay-Muslim and non-Malay masses. On the one hand, for Malay-Muslims, 
there was no additional utility in voting for a juridical Islamic state ala-PAS when definitive features 
of an Islamic state were already in place and could only be expanded further under Abdullah Badawi’s 
Islam Hadhari. On the other hand, to non-Malays, so-called ‘Islamic states’ have customarily been 
perceived as non-democratic, ruthless, backward and inappropriate for a plural society. Since the 
main Malay parties were intent on governing according to Islamic norms, it was always the safer 
option to throw support behind BN, whose version of Islam was arguably less rigid and which had 
a proven track record of lasting political cooperation with non-Malays. Abdul Hadi Awang’s image 
as a fiery and radical firebrand did not help uplift PAS’s reputation among non-Malay and Malay-
Muslim masses.14
Since the electoral setback of 2004 and a further string of by-election defeats, deliberations on 
the ISD seem to have stalled in preference for internal party reforms. PAS has been at pains to revive 
its fortunes which once saw it amassing half of Malay- Muslim votes and significant non-Malay 
support. This paper traces ideological and paradigm shifts in PAS to the wider tectonics of Malaysian 
politics, economy and society. Since Malaysia itself has undergone rapid changes of diverse socio-
economic manifestations, PAS had accommodated such changes as reflected in its steady ideological 
shifts. This was not surprising, for PAS was modelled as first and foremost a political party whose 
survival depended on a continuous stream of support which were tangibly translated into votes 
during regular polls. The utility of PAS as the major Malay opposition party used to lie with its 
ability to identify with marginalised sections of society. Even disgruntled segments of the ruling 
establishment have benefited from formal or informal alliances with PAS during their days of being 
sidelined by the powers that be.15 The practical implementation of PAS’s ideological discourse had 
always had to take into account local factors and dimensions of wider happenings to have any 
realistic chance of amassing long-lasting support of respectable magnitude.16 Monolithic discourse is 
more characteristic of cadre-based Islamic movements whose survival relies less upon the command 
of a mass following. Herein lays the current dilemma of PAS: whether to model itself as an Islamic 
movement which is indifferent to the achievement of direct electoral success, or to pedantically 
fashion itself as a broad-based political party. By trying to gain the best of both, it may actually end 
up being accused by both hardcore Islamists and liberal sympathisers as treacherous to its declared 
objectives and programmes. Short term political contingencies, such as internal rifts within UMNO 
and BN, cannot be relied upon to build solid long term grassroots support. Whatever ideals and 
objectives PAS decides to espouse and propagate, sustained opposition to the ruling establishment 
has to be cultivated by earnestly converting people’s votes from ‘anti-BN votes’ to ‘votes for PAS’. 
The present paper suggests that new trajectories and directions in PAS can be persevered only with 
internal reform at levels of both ideological thought and structural organisation.  
B. Ideological shifts and social base transformations in PAS
Considering the many studies that have been done on PAS, including recent works examining 
transformations in PAS (Noor, 2003a: 200-232; Liow, 2004a: 359-372), and the tendency of 
scholarship on political Islam to be framed in terms of the ‘PAS versus UMNO’ conflict (Hussein, 
2002: 74-107; Malhi, 2003: 236-265; Liow, 2004b: 184-205; Ahmad-Farouk, 2005: 51-63), the 
present author does not wish to delve into the details of such matters. 
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It is sufficient here to show that each internal metamorphosis experienced by PAS has been 
directly related to and preceded by wider politico-ideological shifts and socio-economic mutations. 
Founded by the breakaway ulama (religious scholars) section of UMNO in November 1951, the 
then Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP)’s formative stages (c. 1951-55) were characterised by 
indecisive leadership, vagueness of direction and institutional naivety within a political outlook 
that was broadly pro-establishment. Having interlocking membership with UMNO, then UMNO 
leader Tunku Abdul Rahman suspected PMIP to be the proxy of UMNO sympathisers of Dato’ Onn 
Jaafar, who had earlier left UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in protest 
against UMNO’s refusal to accept non-Malay membership. Its inaugural constitution professed 
the objectives of a union of Islamic brotherhood and unified Islamic administrations throughout 
Malaya rather than an Islamic state per se (bin Ibrahim, 1981: 27-36).
Such rightist perspectives were transformed with the steady influx of anti-establishment Malay 
nationalists of anti-UMNO persuasions from the British-banned Malay Nationalist Party (PKMM: 
Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya) and the Party of Muslims (HM: Hizb al-Muslimin), culminating in 
the election of renowned anti-colonial activist Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy as President in December 
1956 (Funston, 1976: 71-73). Under Dr. Burhanuddin, PAS’s discourse was re-oriented towards 
a hybridised ideological symbiosis between Islamism, leftist Malay nationalism and fervent anti-
imperialism. The ruling establishment and observers were quick to censure PAS for its religious 
puritanism and zealous communalism (von der Mehden, 1963: 609-615; Ratnam, 1969: 351-361), 
overshadowing many aspects of openness in PAS’s ideology. PAS’s prominent spokesmen such 
as Zulkiflee Muhammad (Vice-President 1956-64), denied an Islamic state ala-Pakistan to be its 
ultimate goal. This was in line with its Ulama Section’s 1958 resolution that an Islamic state was 
obligatory only insofar as it was necessary for the realisation of syari’ah (Islamic law), and even then, 
gradualism was preferred to revolutionary change (Funston, 1980: 148-149; bin Ibrahim, 1981: 
107-109). Dr. Burhanuddin’s broad formulation of Malay nationality as not the hereditary right of 
the Malay race, but instead a political category encompassing people willing to profess allegiance 
to the Malay nation, provided an avenue for the absorption of non-Malays as definitive Malaysian 
citizens, parallel to what we call today as Bumiputeras (sons of the soil) (Jaffar, 1980: 13 dan 112-
121). In the relatively backward east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, voting in successive PAS state 
governments became a channel to express dissent based on the Malay peasantry class’ grievances 
against the capitalist-elitist federal administration (Kessler, 1978).
While Dr. Burhanuddin moulded PAS with a progressive nationalist outlook, his death in 1969 
heralded an era of regressive Malay nationalism under Mohamad Asri Muda (President 1969-82). 
PAS not only embraced exclusive Malay communitarianism, but also participated in the ruling 
BN government (1973-77). In agreeing to such a pact, PAS was influenced by UMNO calls for 
Malay and national unity within a post-New Economic Policy (NEP) setting. The NEP had been 
enunciated in response to the 13 May 1969 racial riots, which were attributed to the alienation felt 
by Malays in virtually all aspects of national life, notwithstanding the existence of constitutional 
provisions protecting their special position. Conditioned by an atmosphere of a Malay community 
apparently under siege, PAS’s overriding concern became a defence of Malay culture and language, 
Islam being a mere appendage (Hamzah, 1989: 15-38; Muhammad, 1978: 187-191). Although 
participation in government gave PAS leaders administrative experience and spoils of power, in the 
long term PAS was at the losing end. Humiliated in its stronghold state of Kelantan,17 it failed to 
make inroads in other states. Worse, it lost credibility among its Islamist constituents who flocked 
to the new Islamic revivalist movements during the embryonic years of Islamic resurgence (Abdul-
Hamid, 2002: 87-124).
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Mohamad Asri’s incapacity of detecting simmering discontent over his subordination of Islam 
to Malay cultural nationalism, when events such as the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan were galvanizing the religious sensitivities of Malay-Muslims, cost him dearly. PAS was 
experiencing a social base transformation from ‘nationalists with Islamic aspirations’ to ‘Islamist 
aspirants to power’, culminating in the ouster of Mohamad Asri in 1983. This takeover was led by 
the so-called Young Turks who joined PAS from other new revivalist movements such as the Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) and the clandestine Islamic 
Representative Council (IRC). Under Mohamad Asri’s successor, Haji Yusuf Rawa, PAS intellectually 
aligned itself with contemporary trends in Islamic resurgence by repudiating nationalism of all 
variants (Yusof-Rawa, 1995: 43-78), revived demands for an Islamic state, remodelled its discourse 
with Islamist political vocabulary, such as depicting itself as the voice of the mustazaffin (oppressed 
masses) against the mustakbirin (oppressors). The biggest structural transformation was the 
inauguration of the ‘ulama leadership’, as embodied in the establishment of a Majlis Shura Ulama 
(Ulama Consultative Council), consisting of 12 religious scholars and headed by a Murshid al-’Am 
(General Guide). Although the presidential office and the Central Executive Committee (CEC) still 
existed, ultimate decision making was in the hands of the Majlis Shura al-Ulama.18
 Under the ulama leadership, PAS has been constantly accused by the BN-controlled state of 
creating fissures within the Malay-Muslim community through a re-ignition of the kafir-mengkafir 
controversy,19 which in turn supposedly had a direct bearing on the few pathetic attempts of militant 
insurrection to install an Islamic state in Malaysia. With its pro-Islamic state ideology, PAS was 
a convenient scapegoat in the event of violent intra-Malay clashes such as the Memali and Al-
Ma’unah rebellions in 1985 and 2000 respectively (Abdul-Hamid, 2007: 9-24). Such political 
convulsions, unusual in the case of Malaysia, were perhaps symptomatic of the dilemmas facing 
the Malay-Muslims in their wider search for identity in a society undergoing rapid urbanisation and 
modernisation. Dr. Mahathir’s Malaysia has been characterised by unprecedented industrialisation 
and uneven development, accompanied by growth of social ills, materialistic culture and 
psychological disparities between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (Muzaffar, 1987: 13-22). While the 
downtrodden ‘have-nots’ may have consistently supported opposition parties, to a minority of 
them, the turn towards violence reflects lack of conviction in the constitutional means of acquiring 
political power, as officially espoused by PAS.
At the other end of the socio-economic spectrum, by the late 1990s, the rising middle class was 
prepared to give room for PAS leaders to prove on their anti-corruption rhetoric and corresponding 
pledges of support for democracy, justice and good governance. To the upcoming and increasingly 
vocal sections of civil society, politics was becoming increasingly issues-based and concerned with the 
question of popular participation in decision making, rather than being rigidly drawn along ethno-
religious lines. The emerging middle class demonstrates a reasonable degree of civil consciousness 
and holds dearly universalistic causes such as human rights, women’s rights, consumer awareness 
and environmental issues, most of which are externalized in the informal political world of interest 
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Saravanamuttu, 2001: 103-118; Loh Kok Wah, 
2003: 277-279 dan 2005: 34-44). It was this broad-based constituency which gave PAS a respectable 
amount of support in the 1999 elections. PAS was then treated as the voice of legitimate dissent, 
which could be translated in tangible terms at the polls. But in 2003-04, PAS failed to read the 
politico-economic transformation in the undercurrents of Malaysian society and tried to introduce 
the Islamic state per se in the discursive space of political discourse, with disastrous results. The 
middle class was repelled by PAS’s retrogressive slide back towards an institutional creation which 
was seen to be not in tandem with civil society’s wider, post-primordial concerns.20    
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Globalisation and persistent repression under Mahathir-style authoritarianism have influenced 
the transformation of Muslim civil society’s discourse from its ethno-religious pre-occupation in the 
1970s-80s to a universalism transcending ethno-cultural loyalties in the following decade (Abu Bakar, 
2001: 64-69). Dr. Mahathir’s post-NEP public advocacy for a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nation), 
despite its amorphousness and contradictions (Beng, 2006: 47-72) as the common identity of 
Malaysians of all ethnicities, also had had its impact in watering down Malay-Muslim ethnocentrism. 
As testified by research on the new Malaysian middle class, the ‘new politics’ of the 1990s had 
been significantly characterised by the rising and very active involvement of Malay-Muslims in the 
discourses and practices of participatory democracy, justice and human rights (Saravanamuttu, 2001: 
113; Loh Kok Wah, 2003: 278). Under such a scenario of social base transformation, the new Malay-
Muslim middle class had reasons to worry about the sincerity of PAS’s commitment to democracy. 
Among the Old Guard leaders, who were themselves the Young Turks of the early 1980s, under the 
pretext of internal unity, most lamented the increasing competition for posts during PAS General 
Assemblies. Open canvassing for votes is deplored in such contests, and the nomination and vote 
counting processes are still shrouded in secrecy. However, the Old Guard’s repeated calls to settle 
leadership tussles via shura (consultation) have remarkably gone unheeded.21 This indicates the 
penetration of middle class elements and values into PAS’s grassroots membership. How durable 
these changes are remains to be seen.
The entrée of the growing Malay middle class into the upper echelons of PAS has been important to 
counterbalance the perennially negative image associated with Abdul Hadi Awang’s past association 
with radicalism. As a result of the social base transformation which has affected especially the Youth 
and Women’s sections of PAS, the past few general assemblies have seen criticisms and counter-
criticisms pitting the so-called Young Turks, progressives, professionals and liberals with the Old 
Guard, conservatives or ulama.22 But the democratising impact of the middle class penetration into 
PAS has been limited. The leadership has been more open in tolerating the ideas of a female Vice 
President, PAS-approved entertainment concerts and outlets, limitations to powers of the Majlis 
Shura Ulama and future cooperation with non-Muslims, to the extent of possible acceptance of non-
Muslim membership of the party (Tan, 2003; Razak-Ahmad, 2004).23 While the new breed of leaders 
such as Deputy President Nasharuddin Mat Isa is “serious about establishing a mainstream image,” (Tan, 
2007), PAS has struggled to portray itself as a party which completely disavows extra-constitutional 
means of acquiring power. Despite enormous pressure put on PAS by the country’s religious 
officialdom, PAS’s ulama, spearheaded by Abdul Hadi Awang himself, has refused to withdraw the 
Amanat Haji Hadi – blamed for the bloody showdown between security forces and PAS villagers in 
Memali, Kedah in November 1985, and has also issued statements condoning suicide bombing in 
Palestine and street demonstrations as an election strategy (Abdul-Hamid, 2007: 14-16).24 PAS has 
been at pains to deny the existence of linkages between its Islamist doctrines and Islamic-related 
intended and actual violence, especially with the disclosures that some of the insurrectionists were 
PAS members or sympathisers or family members of prominent PAS personalities. In the case of the 
Mujahidin Group of Malaysia (KMM: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia), which allegedly had links with 
the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiah terrorist network and whose cells were vanquished in a series 
of ISA arrests starting in August 2001, the purported leader was Nik Adli Nik Aziz, son of PAS’s own 
Murshid al-‘Am (Abuza, 2002: 445; Abdullah, 2005: 39-42).25 In the wake of the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, PAS’s 
decision to throw support behind Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan’s Taliban government in its 
anti-Western jihad rhetoric, seemed to confirm the impression PAS did have a furtive fifth column 
agenda. The consequence was a further alienation of non-Muslims and Malay-Muslim civil society 
from PAS’s political programme (Noor, 2002: 165-170).
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Moreover, the ulama-led PAS’s history with democracy has been far from rosy. Whereas its 
leaders have repeatedly reaffirmed the party’s commitment to democracy, this democracy is arguably 
confined to procedural democracy in the electoral context. Convinced that “if true democracy were 
implemented, PAS’s struggle would be accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims,”26 Abdul Hadi Awang has 
blamed PAS’s humiliating defeat in the 2004 elections squarely on the corruption of democracy 
by the ruling establishment, in particular the biased mainstream media, the Election Commission 
(SPR: Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya) and the National Registration Department (Abdul-Hamid, 2006: 117-
118).27 The preamble to the Islamic State Document of 2003 vows that “PAS has accepted democracy 
as the best methodology through which it should realize the ambition, vision and mission of its political 
struggle,”28 but according to a liberal Muslim critique of the ISD, the document is ”largely silent 
over the role of the judges and the judiciary,…. riddled with several statements which have the effect of 
negating the supremacy of elected representatives in law-making,” hence rendering it “inconsistent with 
democratic principles.” (Halim, 2003) In spite of PAS’s constant condemnation of the ISA, the head 
of PAS Youth’s demands for legal action ala-ISA to be taken against a group of 50 NGOs who had 
submitted a memorandum to the government protesting against the state’s moral policing, sent 
shudders throughout civil society, who was understandably alarmed at what form of treatment 
would be meted out to them in a PAS-ruled state (Omar, 2005).
In situations where PAS has the upper hand in decision making, its encounters with democracy 
have been decidedly unimpressive. In the mid-1980s, overtures to the Chinese community via the 
Chinese Consultative Council (CCC) were cut short by internal opposition from within PAS and 
the reluctance to allow CCC members to contest in elections on PAS tickets (Hamzah, 1989: 53-57; 
Mohd Zain, 2005: 82-83). More than a decade later, within the BA coalition, PAS created an unfair 
burden on its non-Muslim partners to explain the applicability of an Islamic state to their party rank-
and-file, leading to DAP’s eventual withdrawal from BA.29 During the early years of its administration 
in Kelantan, while PAS has admittedly instituted successful Islamic reforms, most of its Islamisation 
programmes lacked grassroots participation and feedback; its paternalistic implementation not 
unlike the ‘inculcation of Islamic values’ approach of the BN federal government (Salleh, 2000b: 
161-185). PAS also undemocratically spurned offers of help from other Islamic movements such as 
Darul Arqam and the Society for Islamic Reform (JIM: Jemaah Islah Malaysia) to help its Islamisation 
efforts in Kelantan, to the extent of proscribing the former’s grand Islamic Cultural Concert and 
Annual World Gathering scheduled for September 1991 (Salleh, 1999a: 252-253; 1999b: 194-
195). Later, in 1994, PAS uncritically welcomed the federal government’s wholesale banning of 
Darul Arqam (Abdul-Hamid, 2003: 370). Throughout its 16 and 4 years of ruling Kelantan and 
Terengganu respectively, PAS has shown complete disregard for the idea of reviving local council 
elections, which were suspended in 1965 during the Confrontation with Indonesia and abandoned 
altogether following the 1969 racial riots.30 This is despite persistent calls by civil society for local 
councillors to be held fully accountable to the people,31 and in spite of SPR having given the green 
light for PAS state governments to conduct municipal elections if they so wished.32
There is no doubt that PAS’s democratic disposition improved during PAS’s later years of power, 
if only because its majority had been reduced by the withdrawal of Semangat 46 from the PAS-
led coalition; thus the need to expand its support base. This was supplied by the middle class 
revolt during Reformasi euphoria of 1998-99, if only temporarily. For a sizable number of Malay-
Muslims, however, the experiences of dealing with or having been under PAS rule have convinced 
them that Abdul Hadi Awang’s assurances, that under PAS’s Islamic state - re-affirmed as PAS’s 
ultimate objective upon his official installation as PAS President,33 there would be democracy “not 
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just for elections or on election days, but democracy at all times including for governance and administration 
purposes,” rang hollow (Amin, 2007).
C. Recent Criticisms of PAS and PAS’s response
Criticisms of PAS have come not only from the trans-ethnic middle class-dominated civil society, 
but also from fellow Islamists. Given a choice at the ballot box, Islamists holding similar opinions 
as the critics would probably vote PAS anyway, if only for the lack of a better Islamist representative 
in electoral politics. But in the event of them abstaining during polls, PAS would have to regard such 
‘lost votes’ as costly, considering the narrow margins of victories in many Malay-majority marginal 
constituencies. Since the pool of votes from PAS members would be limited, Islamists who are not 
members of PAS would naturally form a potential constituency to deliver ‘sympathetic’ votes for 
PAS in regular elections. But the appearance of recent critiques of PAS from fellow Islamists, who are 
former PAS leaders to boot, point to a different trajectory resulting from disappointments with PAS. 
Within the past one year, two books by two well-known if somewhat controversial Islamist 
leaders have offered stinging criticisms of PAS. The first, Politik Islam Membawa Kasih Sayang 
(Islamic Politics Brings Forth Love and Fraternity) (Ashaari-Muhammad, 2007), was authored by 
Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad (d. 2010), former leader of the sufi-revivalist Darul Arqam movement 
banned by the Malaysian state in 1994 over theological questions. Consequently, the security forces 
instituted a clampdown on Darul Arqam’s self-sustaining settlements and activities, culminating 
in large-scale detentions of its leaders under the ISA.34 Following the official disbandment of Darul 
Arqam, Ustaz Ashaari and his family were relocated to the town of Rawang, Selangor and later to 
Labuan island off the Bornean coast of Sabah until late October 2004, when he was eventually 
released from restricted residence regulations. A successful businessman, since 1997 Ustaz Ashaari 
had remobilised his loyal followers under the aegis of Rufaqa’ Corporation, which is involved 
in such diverse forms of businesses as retail supermarkets, restaurants and cafeterias, polyclinics 
and maternity services, traditional therapy, production and distribution of herbal-based products, 
boutiques and tailor shops, travel and tour agencies, book and magazine publishing, an arts and 
cultural academy, laundry services, bakeries, motivational and counselling programmes, multimedia 
products, electrical and electronic workshops, vehicle workshops and hotel and inn chains.35 Ustaz 
Ashaari was also a prolific writer of socio-religious tracts, but most of his nearly 70 books had been 
banned by Malaysia’s Internal Security Ministry. Politik Islam Membawa Kasih Sayang is presently 
under scrutiny by the Department for the Advancement of Islam in Malaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan 
Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) – the hub of Malaysia’s religious bureaucracy.36
In Politik Islam Membawa Kasih Sayang, Ustaz Ashaari – a stern PAS activist in Selangor during his 
youth,37 castigated Islamic parties which vie for political power via elections, the process of which 
is marred by a melange of unIslamic traits and practices. To Ustaz Ashaari, the ends never justify 
the means. He outlined what he believed to the true characteristics of Islamic leaders, followers 
and jemaahs (organisations) and contrasts them with what transpires in modern so-called Islamic 
political parties, which he called “secularist Islamic parties” whose bastion is ideology, not religion, 
which is based on revelation (Ashaari Muhammad, 2007: 50). The alternative to electoral politics 
would be internal motivational courses for and tarbiyyah (education) of party members, until love 
and care are externalised towards not only fellow Muslims but also non-Muslims, who would 
and should be delighted at the ascendancy of Islamic parties (Ashaari Muhammad, 2007: 30, 50, 
104). In contrast to contemporary Muslim politics which involves itself in pugnacious campaigns, 
slogans and propaganda, true Islamic politics practises and exhibits love and fraternity through the 
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operation of exemplary multi-dimensional systems of life. Belying its formal registration as a private 
limited company, what took place in Rufaqa’ Corporation, claimed Ustaz Ashaari, was part of the 
realisation of Islamic politics (Ashaari Muhammad, 2007: 12, 18). He devoted the whole chapter 7 
of his book to listing the achievements of his prescribed methods, citing testimonies from foreign 
scholars and tangible accomplishments of his jemaah, seen as a continuum since the founding of 
Darul Arqam in 1968. This success story was then contrasted with the myriad problems faced by 
PAS in administering Kelantan, outlined in chapter 8
Ustaz Ashaari criticised PAS’s Kelantan government for prioritizing legalistic changes, such as the 
abortive attempt to introduce hudud38 laws, as the cornerstone of an Islamic state. Such endeavours 
took place without prior adequate tarbiyyah of the Kelantan population and more importantly of 
Kelantan’s PAS members, who are supposed to lead the way of Islamising the state by becoming 
role models for others. As a result of the weak human development machinery in Kelantan, PAS 
members lack the internal strength to sacrifice their material wealth and comfort to help their state 
government beset with financial difficulties. To Ustaz Ashaari, the solution to economic disparities 
lay not so much in the efforts of Islamic banks and public and private sector financial institutions, 
but in inculcating in affluent citizens the moral obligation to depart from part of their wealth in 
order to shelter the poor. Such a feat is impossible without a comprehensive tarbiyyah programme 
emphasising spiritual education. While praising Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat for personally sacrificing 
his personal allocations and privileges, Ustaz Ashaari separated Nik Abdul Aziz’s private demeanour 
from the public domain, where even PAS members failed to emulate their Murshid al-‘Am, not 
to mention the Kelantan common folk. Ustaz Ashaari regarded the propensity of Kelantan’s PAS 
administration to rely on federal funds to develop its Islamic state as embarrassing. In contrast 
to their leaders’ virtuous character, PAS’s grassroots members’ conduct leaves much to be desired 
(Ashaari Muhammad, 2007: 120-123, 158-173).
The second book criticising PAS is a self-authored autobiography by Dato’ Emeritus Professor 
Shahnon Ahmad, a Sasterawan Negara (national literary laureate), entitled Perjalananku Sejauh Ini: 
Sebuah Autobiografi (My Journey Till Now: An Autobiography) (Ahmad, 2006). A productive writer 
of best-selling novels, some of which have been turned into films and television dramas, Shahnon 
had a distinguished academic career at the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, as lecturer, 
professor, Dean of the School of Humanities and Director of the Islamic Centre. In recognition 
for his services and academic contributions at national and international level, the Kedah state 
government and USM honoured him with the titles of ‘Dato’’ and Emeritus Professor in 1980 and 
1993 respectively. A long-time UMNO member, in the mid-1990s he became close to PAS leaders 
and therefore fell out of favour with the ruling establishment. PAS President Fadzil Noor twice visited 
his home to offer him PAS candidature for general elections: in 1995, when he declined, and in 
1999, when he accepted and went on to memorably beat Minister in Prime Minister’s Department, 
Abdul Hamid Othman to become one-term Member of Parliament for Sik, Kedah (1999-2004). He 
claims to be quite close to Anwar Ibrahim; thus, in the heat of the Reformasi ferment, he produced 
the notorious political satire, Shit, which lampooned the UMNO-led ruling elites (Ahmad, 2006: 
106-107).
The uppermost factor determining Shahnon’s volte-face towards PAS was a firm conviction 
in the concept of ulama leadership. He eulogises especially Murshid al-‘Am Nik Abdul Aziz Nik 
Mat, whose writings revolve a lot around eschatological-cum-spiritual questions of life after death 
(Ahmad, 2006: 93-98). But Shahnon expresses disappointment that lower level PAS leaders and the 
rank-and-file denigrate the importance of such discourses, and prefer instead to focus on political 
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diatribes. Shahnon attributes this negative development of ‘politics overwhelming and controlling 
‘aqidah (faith)’ to the aggressive tactics and activities of the PAS Youth. Shahnon expresses aghast 
and disgust at the prospect of PAS being eventually overtaken by ‘secular’ leaders who brand 
themselves as modern and post-modern ulama (Ahmad, 2006: 110-113). He admonishes the new 
breed of PAS’s ulama for failing to come out with written discourses of substantive intellectual 
quality for public consumption, such that the role of the Ulama Section have been submerged 
by upcoming political rhetoricians.39 For example, although the theoretical explication of PAS’s 
concept of the Islamic state is clear on paper, PAS’s ulama have failed to come up with supporting 
explanations and argumentative reasonings which may then invite responses and feedback from the 
public on the proposed model. Despite PAS being the most avid proponent of the concept of the 
Islamic state, PAS has not undertaken the responsibility to transform burgeoning public interest in 
the Islamic state into fresh debate and healthy discourse. It has remained contented at reacting to 
UMNO politicians’ random remarks on the Islamic state; hence, the ‘Islamic state’ remains a vague 
concept to non-Muslims and lay Muslims, and worse still, even grassroots PAS members are left in 
the dark on the exact mechanisms of an Islamic state. This in itself is evidence of the pitiful lack 
of tarbiyyah and democratisation of knowledge within PAS, whose weakness Shahnon sums up as 
“lacking internal strength.”40
Interestingly, Shahnon contrasts these shortcomings of PAS with the inner vitality of Darul 
Arqam, with which Shahnon had a brief association before joining PAS (Ahmad, 2006: 69-89). To 
Shahnon, the strength of Darul Arqam lies in its global concept of tarbiyyah as encompassing not 
only formal education, but also in the active erection of comprehensive systems of life, emphasising 
sustainable economic development. Darul Arqam’s distinctive trait, which PAS fails to emulate, is its 
inclination to “talk a little” but “act a lot.” As such, the secular authorities fear Darul Arqam more than 
PAS, hence its banning of and clampdown on Darul Arqam. Despite falling out with the state, the 
mere mention of ‘Darul Arqam’ conjures the image of a much acclaimed Malay-Muslim economic 
powerhouse still held in awe by ruling elites for its material success, accomplished without relying 
on state patronage. In contrast, says Shahnon, the secular establishment openly pours contempt 
and makes a mockery of PAS, especially when its ulama leadership is being gradually marginalised 
and perhaps later displaced (Ahmad, 2006: 102-103).41
In an interview with Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat at the official Kelantan Chief Minister’s residence 
in Kota Bharu on 14 August 2007,42 the present author asked Nik Abdul Aziz’s responses to the 
criticisms thrown by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad and Shahnon Ahmad. Nik Abdul Aziz does not 
deny the prevalent weaknesses in PAS, especially the incapacity to balance between political 
imperatives and the urgency of internal tarbiyyah. Nik Abdul Aziz has exhorted PAS members to 
speak on behalf of Islam and not necessarily PAS, because as a man-organised political party, PAS 
has admittedly many failings. In Kelantan, with political power at its behest, PAS has allotted RM40 
million in its annual budget to institute reforms establishing schools and educational institutions 
which integrate religious sciences with modern sciences.43 Nik Abdul Aziz expresses confidence that 
in the long term, products of such education would eventually end the ‘ulama versus professional’ 
dichotomy which has so plagued PAS of recent years and disillusioned such idealists as Shahnon 
Ahmad. An efficient tarbiyyah curriculum would be implanted in the schools from rudimentary 
levels of education. Nik Abdul Aziz laments the unfair treatment given in the past to Darul Arqam 
arising from disagreements over subsidiary matters, but insists that he was not directly involved 
in the Kelantan government’s decision to obstruct Darul Arqam’s planned grand programmes in 
1991. He defends PAS’s adherence to electoral democracy as the rational means to political power, 
in contrast with the ‘irrational’ views of Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, who conjures a millenarian 
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picture of Malaysia becoming an Islamic state via a power takeover by peaceful Islamist elements 
(Aam, 2006: 212-220; Ashaari Muhammad, 2007: 248-259; Hj Ashaari dan Ahmad, 2007: 74-75).
D. Concluding remarks
PAS has not been immune to the vast changes affecting Malaysian society within a rapidly 
globalizing and modernizing world. It is possible to imagine conflicting identities within one social 
configuration; one person or one organization may possess and exhibit different emblems of identity 
at different times, places and circumstances. In the case of PAS, it becomes ummatically Islamist 
when it preaches to its urban Islamic constituency. When facing its traditional Muslim constituency 
in rural areas, its local, probably even communalist, image is emphasised. When it wants to appeal 
to multi-ethnic middle class elements, it projects a modern, cosmopolitan face. The extent of PAS’s 
success at the polls depends on how well PAS balances out between its contending images, and how 
strongly its prospective voters identify PAS as the party which mostly represents their ideals, hopes 
and aspirations. It should not be a surprise to us that sometimes apparently conflicting statements 
are issued by different PAS leaders, who are representing their respective orientations, perhaps 
inadvertently. In admitting to having pronounced views which contradict those of Murshid al-’Am 
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang argues that such seeming contradictions 
are evidence of the presence of democracy and the absence of theocracy in PAS.44 Ironically, this 
attitude makes PAS acquire a similar pragmatism with UMNO, which portrays a stoutly Malay-
centric face in front of its hardcore Malay-Muslim supporters, but projects the image of ‘modern 
Malays agreeable to inter-ethnic harmony and cooperation’ when it speaks, as a member of the BN 
coalition, to a multi-ethnic audience. To Malay-Muslims, UMNO vilifies PAS for not being as Islamic 
as UMNO is, but to non-Malays, UMNO conjures up the fear of having to live in fear under a PAS-
ruled Islamic state governed by medieval precepts. In the discursive area of public perception, PAS 
is both not Islamic enough and too Islamic, depending on the audience’s understanding of Islam. 
Whatever its characterisation of PAS’s Islam is, it carries negative connotations as far as UMNO is 
concerned.
In the world of contending images, PAS suffers from serious disadvantages vis-à-vis BN, simply 
by virtue of the latter’s enormous control of the media. In a 2004 post-election interview with Reuters 
from behind his prison walls, Anwar Ibrahim blamed PAS’s defeat mostly on the inadequacy of its 
efforts in shedding the negative perception that PAS was intent upon creating an Islamic state ala-
Taliban should it triumph. In BN propaganda, parts of its programme highlighting peace, democracy 
and justice were submerged by BN’s emphasis on PAS’s zeal for an Islamic state and hudud (Ibrahim, 
2005: 281-282). This does not deny the importance of electoral irregularities, gerrymandering and 
fraud in delivering elections to BN. But PAS cannot afford to blame its defeat on a host of external 
factors which opposition parties have had to grapple with in all elections. Instead, PAS has to rival 
BN’s propaganda by engaging the public in healthy discourse and debate on its plans in the Islamic 
state it envisions. The outlets available to PAS are the alternative media: the wide range of anti-
establishment tabloids and the internet. Tabloids such as Siasah, Buletin Rakyat, Suara Keadilan and 
even PAS-owned Harakah still have limited circulation due to lack of finance; this is where material 
sacrifice from PAS’s own members are able to raise publication and distribution levels of such pro-
PAS newspapers.
Having a powerful appeal to young middle class Malaysians is the internet, on which PAS 
needs to improve the quality of its discourse to reflect more democracy. For example, the Islamic 
State Document and other articles by PAS leaders could be discussed and debated via blogs, which 
then enable PAS’s Research Centre to gauge the public feedback to the party’s proposals. At the 
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moment, PAS’s website45 displays a top-to-bottom one-way flow of discussion, which is not helped 
by the superfluous presence of anti-UMNO diatribes issued by its Information and Dakwah46 Bureau 
(Lujnah Penerangan dan Dakwah PAS Pusat).47 PAS’s website would be more credible if it had a regular 
forum for PAS’s Research Centre, which until now lacks an official mouthpiece, except for a regular 
column in Harakah English Section. Intellectual research and discourse, synthesizing the best from 
traditional and modern Islamist discourses, should be put at the forefront of PAS’s agenda. Relying 
on political rhetoric of low intellectual quality may be able to whip up the masses into a sway of 
emotional support for PAS, but it does not create a long-lasting pool of supporters who could be 
relied on to vote consistently for PAS in successive elections. The fragility of this kind of support is 
further accentuated if it was determined more by a rejection of BN and UMNO rather than being 
a substantive endorsement of PAS’s policies. Even with the reforms suggested above, PAS faces an 
uphill battle to woo the middle class electorate on account of its own strength. Despite recent 
estimates putting the internet-savvy community at around 11 million, only a small proportion of 
those had a penchant for surfing anti-establishment sites (Tan, 2007). 
With general elections looming, PAS may not have enough time to institute the necessary 
structural transformations which can form a solid support base for PAS from among middle class 
elements. But it is high time that PAS’s leadership commence long term planning in line with 
transformations of Malaysia’s social undercurrents, without necessarily jeopardising its Islamist 
fundamentals. The apparent wedge between both imperatives calls for intellectual reform or tajdid 
(renewal) to harmonise them. Too much internal politicking has disillusioned such middle class 
Islamists as Shahnon Ahmad and the renowned consultant-motivator Dr. Hassan Ali, who, on the 
verge of relinquishing his Vice President’s post in the recent 53rd General Assembly, had disclosed 
his upset over the conduct of party elections which neglected shura and the rank-and-file’s labelling 
of him as a secularist.48 Such belligerent behaviour from the point of view of Islamic morality cannot 
be meekly ignored as the necessary side effects of democracy, for it merely goes to prove the lack 
of internal tarbiyyah in PAS. The turn towards militancy among few of PAS’s ordinary members, 
notwithstanding PAS’s official disavowal of violence, is testimony to PAS’s inability to educate its 
members in the peaceful path of true Islamic struggle. Although Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat argues that 
the educational reforms taking place in Kelantan are evidence of PAS moving forward, such reforms 
were undertaken as a corollary of PAS’s assumption and retention of power of the state government. 
Such reforms have eluded other states, where PAS hopes for a continuous stream of support from 
graduates of religious schools, most of which have been taken over by the state. The remaining 
independent schools are run independently by PAS-inclined masters, whose traditional trappings 
might have prevented them from keeping abreast with recent developments in the thoughts and 
discourse of PAS’s ulama and leaders. In Kelantan’s case, if PAS loses power, it automatically loses 
its mechanism for tarbiyyah, which has to be systematised not only among school children but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, among adult members of PAS.
In 2003, the present author called for an internal reformation within PAS to re-invigorate 
its posture as not just a political party but also a comprehensive Islamic movement emphasising 
dakwah and tarbiyyah (Abdul-Hamid, 2003: 11-13). After 4 years, a similar call has been echoed 
in an article in the pro-PAS tabloid, Siasah (Ishak, 2007). That the party rank-and-file has come 
to realise the internal weaknesses and admit the need for changes is encouraging, although such 
candid confessions are still missing from PAS’s official voices. In the present author’s view, PAS’s 
internal weaknesses stem from the paucity of spiritual content in its discourse and thus tarbiyyah. 
Spiritual regeneration brings about virtuous attributes such as willingness to sacrifice one’s own 
comfort for larger causes and tolerance of other people’s views. These in turn engender economic 
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independence and openness to cooperation with groups of different ideological backgrounds. The 
electorate would be more convinced of the viability of PAS’s Islamic state if PAS’s party organisation 
had exhibited qualities which care for potential supporters irrespective of faith and ethnicity. Socio-
welfare activities which establish a bond between leaders and the people, in the manner of the 
successful service centres and complaints bureaus of MCA and Gerakan (Loh Kok Wah, 2005: 19), 
are beckoned for. As far as the grassroots electorate is concerned, it makes no difference whether 
one’s representative is a reputable member of the ulama or not, if he cannot be readily available 
to help them in mundane matters at all times.49 A strong economic base, built out of PAS’s own 
programme, would have been powerful evidence of PAS’s ability to handle national economic 
affairs. Such a message would have struck chords of non-Malays, especially the Chinese, most of 
whom, according to an independent survey by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion and Research, are 
dissatisfied with the government’s economic policies (Nadzri, 2007). 
Emphasis on spiritualism brings us back to the roots of the tolerant form of Islam, couched 
in rational and peaceful Sufism – the mystical path of Islam, that originally arrived in the Malay-
Indonesian world (Abdul-Hamid, 2002: 467-493). The accommodative ideological outlook of Dr. 
Burhanuddin al-Helmy – the PAS President who advocated an eclectic Malay nationalism, could 
also be arguably traced to his strong grounding in Sufism (Funston, 1980: 118, 122; Jaffar, 1980: 
17). Spiritualism will mitigate the inflexible image portrayed by PAS’s juridical form of Islamic state, 
which many non-Muslims and even lay Muslims find too legalistic and inappropriate to Malaysia’s 
mixed cultural heritage. While laws and regulations play an important part in an Islamic state, the 
majority of Malaysians have the misleading impression that Islam is nothing more than a series 
of do’s and don’ts, that Islamisation is but the steady intrusion of the syari’ah into Malaysia’s legal 
system, that the Islamic state is first and foremost a nomocracy.50 If formal codification of the syari’ah 
serves as the only yardstick, it can be argued that based on the flurry of Islamic enactments passed by 
BN-controlled state legislatures since 2000, UMNO is more intent upon Islamising Malaysia than 
PAS is (Roff, 1998: 224-225; Martinez, 2001a: 481-483 dan 2001b: 245-246; Yong Liow, 2004:194-
197). Pro-syari’ah statements by influential lawyers and members of the judiciary, purporting to 
interpret more substantively the constitutional clause that Islam is the religion of the federation, 
such that Islam becomes the overriding feature of governance in Malaysia, have accentuated the 
impression of Islam as law and little else.51 Upping the ante on the Islamic state by politicians of 
both the pro and anti-Islamic state divide, without serious efforts to turn it into healthy intellectual 
discourse on the very concept of the Islamic state, will in the end benefit only the ruling regime, 
which has adroitly exploited the dichotomy of mutually reinforcing prejudices in their quest for 
perpetual political power.52
By the eve of the March 2008 elections, PAS had endeavoured to reinvent its moderate image, 
retracting its open advocacy of an Islamic state and participating actively in general civil society 
causes such as the movement for electoral reform. Its hastily formed People’s Pact (PR: Pakatan 
Rakyat) alliance with the multi-racial Anwar Ibrahim-led People’s Justice Party (PKR: Parti Keadilan 
Rakyat) and DAP gave huge rewards when PAS scored stunning electoral victories.53 Not only did 
PAS manage to retain Kelantan, but it also played instrumental roles in the formation of new 
state governments in Kedah, Perak and Selangor. PAS leaders became Chief Ministers in Kedah 
and Perak, but the latter state was wrested by BN in February 2009 following UMNO-orchestrated 
machinations allegedly involving huge sums of money to induce the defections of two PKR and one 
DAP assemblymen. In the only other state won by PR, Chinese-majority Penang, PAS was contented 
to play second fiddle to DAP and PKR. But was PAS’s performance in 2008 an accurate measure of 
recovery of political ground? The present author contends that, in order for the encouraging post-
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March 2008 developments to be more than merely ephemeral, PAS needs to seriously address long 
term issues highlighted in this article.  
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attempt to unseat the Prime Minister from the UMNO Presidency in 1987, led like-manner anti-Mahathir 
dissidents under the Semangat 46 splinter party, which contested the 1990 and 1995 elections under the PAS-
led APU coalition. Recently, Dr. Mahathir himself, having lost favour with the mainstream media due to his 
persistent attacks on policies of Abdullah Badawi’s administration, has been featured positively in interviews 
by pro-PAS tabloids, which have made much out of his calls for the Kelantanese to retain a PAS government 
in the coming elections in order to give a lesson to UMNO; see ‘Beri PAS menang, tolak BN adalah hak rakyat 
– Dr Mahathir’, Siasah, 9-15 May 2007; and the interview, ‘Kelantan kekal di tangan PAS’, Siasah, 26 Ogos – 1 
September 2007. To the mainstream press, however, it is Dr. Mahathir’s denials of supporting the opposition 
that are highlighted; see Joceline Tan, ‘No compromise with loyalty’, The Sunday Star, 13 May 2007, and ‘Dr. 
M nafi sokong pembangkang’, Utusan Malaysia, 14 May 2007.
16 For instance, the ingenious ability of Kelantanese PAS leaders, in particular of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik 
Mat, in localising universal Islamic discourse has immensely contributed to Kelantan PAS’s resilience and 
endurance in the face of persistent onslaught by UMNO in efforts to regain control of the state government; 
see Farish A. Noor, ‘The Localization of Islamist Discourse in the Tafsir of Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, 
Murshid’ul Am of PAS’ in Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (eds.), Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), (2003: 210-220).
17 PAS’s Kelantan state assemblymen were involved in a bitter row with BN over the federal government’s 
appointment of a Chief Minister against the wishes of PAS, leading to widespread disturbances, invocation 
of emergency powers under Article 150 of the Federal Constitution, expulsion of PAS from BN and PAS’s 
defeat in snap state elections in 1978. The episode is covered by Mohamed (1978: 177-179), and Muhammad 
(1978).
18 The background, causes, drama and immediate impact of PAS’s 1982-83 leadership crisis and 
organisational revamp are detailed in Mutalib (1990: 109-114, 118-125). For a more succinct account, see 
Stark (2004: 52-56).
19 Kafir-mengkafir refers to the mutual accusations between PAS and UMNO members as infidels, leading 
in the mid-1980s to splits within mainly rural Malay-Muslim communities. The cleavages were manifested 
in mutual boycotting of feasts, formation of separate congregational prayer services in mosques and the 
reluctance to recognise the legality of solemnisation of marriages and animal slaughtering performed by the 
other camp. See Abu Bakar (2000: 121-159).
20 The term ‘primordial’ is used here in the manner of Clifford Geertz’s conception of ‘primordial 
attachment’ as one which stems form the ‘givens’ of social existence which easily fuel civil discontent in 
many new nation states in the post-colonial era. Geertz lists 6 ‘givens’, viz. assumed blood ties, race, language, 
region, religion and custom. See Clifford Geertz, ‘The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil 
politics in the new states’ in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The quest for modernity in Asian 
and Africa (New York: The Free Press), (1963: 109-113).
21  In the contest for Deputy President, in 2003, the conservative ulama Hassan Shukri beat lawyer 
Mustafa Ali. In 2005, Nasharuddin Mat Isa, touted as a liberal scholar, trounced incumbent Hassan Shukri 
and former Deputy Chief Minister of Kelantan Abdul Halim Abdul Rahman in a three-cornered fight. In 
2007, Nasharuddin successfully defeated the attempt to unseat him by Harun Taib, erstwhile head of PAS’s 
Ulama Section. See Joceline Tan, Who will be Hadi’s deputy?’, The Star, 7 September 2003; Joceline Tan, ‘High 
drama at PAS muktamar’, The Sunday Star, 14 September 2003; ‘Permuafakatan jawatan timbalan presiden 
gagal’, Berita Minggu, 14 September 2003; ‘Nik Aziz: Avoid contest for PAS No. 2 post’, The Sun, 24 May 2005; 
Joceline Tan, ‘A hard-to-call contest’, The Star, 31 May 2007.
22 Many of these epithets, given by the mainstream media, are opposed by PAS, which insists on the 
feasibility of ‘professionalising’ the ulama and educating the professionals with solid knowledge of the 
essentials of Islam. See the interviews with PAS Murshid al-‘Am Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, ‘Kita harap tuah 
Dr. Haron’, Mingguan Malaysia, 22 May 2005; Youth chief Salahuddin Ayub, ‘PAS mesti tahu membaca 
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid: A Critical Appraisal of Parti Islam Semalaysia’s  |  65
zaman’, Mingguan Malaysia, 22 May 2005; and President Abdul Hadi Awang, ‘Tidak semestinya dengan DAP’, 
Mingguan Malaysia, 12 June 2005. Also, the statement by Vice President Husam Musa, in Razak Beghani, 
‘Tolak labelan mengenai pimpinan PAS’,http://www.pas.org.my/ index.php?option = com_content&task = 
view&id = 670&Itemid = 202 (accessed 31 August 2007).
23 See also ‘PAS poised for woman veep’, New Straits Times, 18 April 2005; ‘Tidak semestinya dengan 
DAP’, Mingguan Malaysia, 12 June 2005; ‘PAS cadang terima bukan Islam’, Utusan Malaysia, 22 May 2006; 
‘PAS wants to work with DAP’, New Straits Times, 8 March 2007; ‘PAS redefines pop culture’, The Sunday Star, 
3 December 2006; Ian MacIntyre, ‘PAS-style dance clubs’, The Sunday Star, 17 December 2006; Joceline Tan, 
‘PAS eases up on having fun’, The Sunday Star, 31 December 2006.
24 See also ‘Kepimpinan yang mempunyai ketokohan dalam pelbagai aspek: PAS akan wujud profesional 
ulama’, Mingguan Malaysia, 21 September 2003; ‘Ulama PAS akan terus pertahan amanat Haji Hadi’, Utusan 
Malaysia, 7 June 2006; ‘Pilihan raya dan Jalan Raya’, Siasah, 9-15 May 07.
25 See also ‘Anak Nik Aziz ditangkap: Disyaki antara tokoh terpenting Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia’, 
Mingguan Malaysia, 5 August 2001.
26 http://www.pas.org.my/muktamar/wawancarapresiden.html(accessed 31 August 2007)
27 See ‘Hadi tuduh media, SPR punca PAS kalah’, Berita Harian, 14 June 2004; Joceline Tan, ‘Hadi’s 
leadership put to test’, http://www.malaysia-today.net/english/MT010904.htm (accessed 31 August 2007).
28 http://www.pas.org.my/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=140&Itemid=93 (accessed 31 
August 2007).
29 ‘Tindakan DAP keluar pakatan untungkan PAS – Nik Aziz’, Utusan Malaysia, 24 September 2001.
30 Murshid al-‘Am Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat has openly opposed local council elections on the grounds that 
they would incur unnecessary expenses; see the interview with him during the 53rd PAS General Assembly at 
http://www.pas.org.my/muktamar/wawancara_TG.html (accessed 1 September 2007).  
31  Since the abandonment of local council elections, municipalities have become tools to dispense state 
patronage and launching pads for the careers of future politicians; see the debates in the cover story, ‘Local 
Power’ of The Edge Malaysia, 22 December 2003: Jacqueline Ann Surin, ‘The all-pervasive influence of local 
councils: If the quality of life of all Malaysians is to improve, local councils must get their act together’; 
Jacqueline Ann Surin, ‘Time for Rethink on Councils’; and ‘Appointment or Elections?’.
32 SPR chairman Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman had indicated so to political scientist Wong Chin Huat 
in front of PAS Central Committee member Dr. Dzulkifli Ahmad; see the interview with Wong Chin Huat, 
‘Ballot watch’, The Sun, 12 July 2007. 
33 See ‘Kepimpinan yang mempunyai ketokohan dalam pelbagai aspek: PAS akan wujud profesional 
ulama’, Mingguan Malaysia, 21 September 2003.
34 For a discussion of doctrinal disagreements between the official Islamic officialdom and Darul Arqam, 
see Abdul Hamid (2005: 87-128). While theology was the ostensible reason for the crackdown upon Darul 
Arqam, the present author believes that the UMNO ruling elites had a hidden political agenda; see Abdul 
Hamid (2000: 32-65).
35 For an account of the transformation from Darul Arqam to Rufaqa’ Corporation, see Ahmad Fauzi 
Abdul Hamid, ‘Dynamics of Changes and Continuities in Islamic Movements in Malaysia: From Darul Arqam 
to Rufaqa’ Corporation’, paper presented at the ‘Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia’ workshop on Islamic studies 
and the Study of Muslim Societies in Southeast Asia, organised by the Southeast Asian Regional Exchange 
Programme (SEASREP) and the School of Liberal Arts, Walailak University, Nakhon SiThammarat, Thailand, 
24-25 February 2007. This article is in preparation for publication as a chapter of a book volume edited by 
Patrick Jory and Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad. 
36 See ‘Buku Ashaari diteliti’, Berita Harian, 1 August 2007.
37 For glimpses of his involvement with PAS during his younger days, see Aam (2006: 86-90).
38 Hudud, the plural of hadd (limit), refers to criminal punishments as instituted by the Quran and Sunnah 
(words, deeds and life of the Prophet Muhammad), such as amputation of the hand for thieves, flogging of 
eighty lashes for consuming intoxicating liquor, flogging for libel, stoning to death for adultery and flogging 
of one hundred lashes for fornication.
39 In the present author’s interview with Shahnon Ahmad at his Penang residence on 25 August 2007, 
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Shahnon openly quoted the examples of former head of PAS’s Ulama Section Harun Taib and current head 
Muhammad Daud Iraqi as lacking conspicuousness and clout for the ulama to have any forceful impact in 
PAS. 
40 Interview with Shahnon Ahmad, 25 August 2007.
41  All points from Perjalananku Sejauh Ini were accentuated by Shahnon Ahmad during the interview with 
him, 25 August 2007.
42 Ever since becoming Chief Minister in 1990, Nik Abdul Aziz has continued to reside in his humble 
village house in Pulau Melaka district. He uses his official residence for the purpose of receiving visitors. 
43 See also Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, Pendirian Tuan Guru Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (edited by Anual Bakri 
Haron) (Kota Bharu: Dian Darulnaim), (2005: 244).
44 The interview, ‘Tidak semestinya dengan DAP’, Mingguan Malaysia, 12 June 2005.
45 http://www.parti-pas.org/
46 Derived from the Arabic term da’wah, dakwah refers to the Islamic missionary effort, whether in the 
context of proselytising activities of Muslims upon non-Muslims, or the spreading the message of Islam as din 
al-hayah (The Way of Life) to born Muslims.
47 http://www.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=7&id=17&Item
id=96 (accessed 5 September 2007).
48 ‘Dr Hassan: Members busy labelling each other’, The Star, 4 June 2007; ‘Hassan cadang pemilihan 
secara syura’, Utusan Malaysia, 4 June 2007; ‘Ucapan penangguhan Muktamar PAS Pusat ke-53 Perlu Dihayati’, 
http://www.pas.org.my/muktamar/ ucapanpenangguhan.html (accessed 5 September 2007).
49 There have been complaints that PAS’s Kelantan state assemblymen, belying their religious reputation, 
have been shirking their responsibilities in serving their constituents; see Joceline Tan, ‘Starting before the 
flag-off’, The Sunday Star, 2 September 2007.
50 These impressions are confirmed in a perception survey conducted by Patricia Martinez, see Martinez 
(2001a: 480-486).
51  See Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar and Nurhidayah Muhd Hashim, ‘Sejarah bukti kukuh Malaysia bukan negara 
sekular’, Berita Harian, 1 August 2007; ‘Mansuh Common Law - Ketua Hakim Negara mahu perundangan 
lapuk Inggeris diganti’, Utusan Malaysia, 22 August 2007; ‘Undang-undang syariah terbaik - Gani’, Utusan 
Malaysia, 23 August 2007; ‘Minister: Study proposal to switch to Syariah law thoroughly’, The Star, 24 August 
2007. For constitutional arguments de-linking Islam’s position as official religion to Malaysia’s Islamic state 
status, see Shad Saleem Faruqi, ‘Respecting the Constitution’, The Star, 3 May 2007; and Shad Saleem Faruqi, 
‘Bedrock of our nation’, The Star, 22 August 2007.
52 When officiating an Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia)-
organised international conference on ‘The Role of Islamic States in a Globalised World’, then Deputy Prime 
Minister Najib Razak unequivocally asserted that Malaysia had never been a secular state, but had always been 
an Islamic state by virtue of Islam being its official religion. When this was disputed by MCA, UMNO Youth 
rose to Najib’s defence and sternly warned those who insisted that Malaysia was a secular state. Urging to stop 
the polemic, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi made the more qualified statement that Malaysia was neither 
secular nor theocratic ala-Iran and Pakistan, as allegedly wished by PAS. See ‘Malaysia bukan negara sekular – 
TPM’, Utusan Malaysia, 18 July 2007; ‘BN and PAS differ on Islamic state’, The Star, 18 July 2007; ‘M’sia Islamic 
state as Islam official religion: What the legal experts and politicians say’, The Sun, 18 July 2007; ‘Amaran 
kepada MCA: Hishamuddin minta henti kenyataan Malaysia negara sekular’, Berita Harian, 21 July 2007; 
‘PM: Malaysia is neither a secular nor theocratic state’, The Sunday Star, 5 August 2007; ‘Hentikan polemik 
Islam, sekular’, Mingguan Malaysia, 5 August 2007; ‘PM: Pembangkang sengaja bangkitkan isu kontrak sosial’, 
Utusan Malaysia, 28 August 2007. PAS has responded by reaffirming its commitment to a “vibrant and genuine 
democratic state”, see PAS Research Centre director Dr Dzulkifli Ahmad’s, ‘Islamic State or Secular State–What?’,http://
englishsection.com/index.php?option=comcontent &task=view &id=140&Itemid=1 (accessed 6 September 2007).
53 ‘Before Vote, PAS Drops “Islamic” Malaysia’, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C
&cid=1203515505407&pagename= Zone-English-News/NWELayout (accessed 21 February 2008); ‘PAS New 
Look Won Malaysian Hearts’, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1203757851714&pa
gename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout, (accessed 9 March 2008).
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